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The „Italicum“ law aims to ﬁx what has ailed the Italian political system for decades: elections produce unstable
majorities at best, and thereby unstable and often dysfunctional governments. Does it achieve that aim? 
It is correct what you say. In fact, the Italian Electoral law called Italicum came into force on 1 July 2016. It
assures to any party that reaches a threshold of 340 seats a stable majority of 530 seats, the so-called jackpot,
possibly after a second electoral ballot. It was conceived to resolve the problem of unstable majorities in a
bicameralism that, at the time, was also in the way to modify towards a bicameralism with a parliamentary vote
of conﬁdence in the only Chamber of Deputies, not for the Senate.
After the constitutional referendum of the last 4th of December, which has said No also on this topic because the
59% of the Italians has voted to maintain the double parliamentary vote of conﬁdence, and after the recent ruling
of the Constitutional Court which has cancelled the second electoral ballot, I am not sure that it will be possible
for a single party to produce a single stable majority in both Chambers, also after the allocation of the jackpot
that the Court has kept in place.
Why?
Because the real political diﬃculty is obtaining the same majority in two Assemblies, which have also diﬀerent
electorates, prescribed in our constitutional text. You have to consider that in four out of six elections since 1994
we had diﬀerent political majorities after the electoral results. The ﬁrst problem for all was always to get diﬀerent
political majorities in the two chambers to form a unique majority, even though the parties had campaigned and
the voters voted in a uniform way.
Therefore, now each political party will certainly try to win both the jackpot in the Chamber of Deputies both the
majority in the Senate but I suppose this will be achieved only under very exceptional circumstances.
How is this approach diﬀerent compared to former legislative attempts in Italy, like Porcellum?
There are several diﬀerences between Italicum and the so called Porcellum. The most relevant is that Italicum
law was realized respecting carefully the ruling of the Court on the Porcellum. And, in fact, you can measure this,
considering that the Court has mostly conﬁrmed the Italicum in the ruling of last week.
What did the Italian Constitutional Court ﬁnd unconstitutional about this law? 
We will have to wait until we get to read the full text of the ruling, but in a detailed press note the Court has
underlined that most aspects were maintained. The Court has declared unconstitutional only two things: the run-
oﬀ between the top two parties, probably because it did not ﬁt into the perfect bicameral system preserved in
December’s referendum; and the Court has declared unconstitutional the possibility for MPs elected in more than
one district, to choose freely, without being bound to the elections’ results, in which one district they want to be
elected.
As you can see, the Court has mostly conﬁrmed the electoral law Italicum; and moreover in the press note the
Court has explained that the Italicum is perfectly and immediately applicable as a basis for the next elections.
What will be the reverberations of this verdict in Italian politics?
This ruling it is very important because it conﬁrms the mechanism of the jackpot, giving the political parties the
opportunity to obtain at least a solid majority in one Chamber, and, at the same time, it conﬁrms the choice of a
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solution of a law based on a system of assured majority. We can imagine that the Court gives politics the
freedom to choose between going back to the so-called ﬁrst phase of the Italian Republic, based on a semi-pure
proportional system, or to pursue the objectives of majoritarian eﬀects notwithstanding a proportional system as
the Italicum is.
Certainly, in a tri-polar political landscape like in Italy it would be diﬃcult for a party or a coalition to reach 40% of
the vote and to obtain the majority bonus in the Chamber. But the political parties could ﬁght for that, and this
eﬀort is a relevant instrument to improve the chances for each of them to have uti singuli the same majority also
in the other Chamber, the Senate. It is a sort of political bet, especially if the parties will present themselves to
electorate in a single party-list as opposed to a coalition list, but it is the only opportunity to overcome the political
fragmentation in a perfect bicameralism where the winner of the elections have to obtain two votes of
conﬁdence, not one as in all other parliamentary democracies.
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